Science as Consensus
One of the most important proponents of the "science as
consensus" view of knowledge has been Thomas Kuhn. He set forth his concept of the
scientific paradigm when he published, "The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions"(1). For Kuhn, scientific paradigms include, "law, theory,
application, and instrumentation together -- [and] provide models from which spring
particular coherent traditions of scientific research" (1, p. 10). The paradigm view
of science pictures the successful scientific community as a consensus group possessing a
paradigm with increasing professional acknowledgment. The concluding analogy used to
illustrate the process of choice between conflicting views of nature (or paradigms) is
evolutionary natural selection. Science is advanced through, "conflict within the
scientific community of the fittest way to practice science" (1, p. 172). This view
of scientific discovery has three phases to its structure.
First is the pre-paradigm phase which is characterized by various schools of thought vying
for position but without sufficient explanatory successes to their credit to gain
preeminence. In this phase the various paradigms are relatively vague and therefore new
observations can be accommodated because the paradigm's indefinite form does not clearly
demarcate what are acceptable or unacceptable results. Discovery occurs as a result of the
more or less random observations made and utilized to formulate a more structured paradigm
view.
Second is the "normal-science" phase where a clearly demarcated paradigm view
has been established as most successful in the eyes of the majority of scientists in that
field. In this case research is conducted for, "determination of significant facts,
matching of facts with theory, and articulation of theory" (1, p. 34). Discovery of
facts that do not fit into the paradigm view are not expected and when
"successful" none are found.
Third is the "revolutionary science" phase where the emergence of anomalies
begin to challenge the reigning paradigm view. In this case researchers uncover certain
facts that can not be fitted within the more precise paradigm in a straight forward
manner. Those anomalies which stubbornly remain irreconcilable have the potential to
become what are called "revolutionary anomalies." A key to the next step is
described by Kuhn as a "period of pronounced professional insecurity" due to the
anomalies' stubborn refusal to be assimilated into the existing paradigm (1, p. 83). This
is only resolved when a choice is made between the old and new paradigm. When this process
of "conversion" occurs it is then possible to recognize not only that some fact
has been discovered but also what the discovery of that fact means in the context of the
new paradigm world view. According to Kuhn a decision like this is not ultimately made
based on some objective facts, but rather, "a decision of that kind can only be made
on faith" (1, p. 158).
Discovery and Acceptance
Kuhn's view of the relationship between discovery and acceptance is in
sharp contrast with the ideas of logical inclusiveness. That interpretation of the nature
and function of scientific theory was closely associated with logical positivism which
would restrict the range and meaning of an accepted theory so that it could not possibly
conflict with any later theory that made predictions about the same natural phenomena.
Kuhn's concept of the relationship between discovery and acceptance was illustrated in one
case by the transition from classical to relativistic dynamics in physics. Here he asserts
that Einstein's theory can be only be accepted with the recognition that Newton's theory
was wrong. On this view the progress of science is not visualized as an increasingly
inclusive field of knowledge, but rather as a series of new and exclusive fields of
knowledge.
At several points Kuhn makes the case that interpretation of factual data alone is not
sufficient impetus for a scientific discovery. The prime case study offered was the
discovery of oxygen by Lavoisier. In his time the phlogiston theory, which explained a
quality understood as "flammability", was a well established and attested
scientific view of nature. Then came Lavoisier's observation of weight gain after
combustion of certain materials such as sulfur and phosphorus. With the unique training
and background that prepared him he was allowed to interpret the weight gain as a
revolutionary anomaly.
George Gale has argued that this anomaly could easily have been accounted for in the
theory by an ad hoc adjustment in the properties of phlogiston (1). All that was
required was the proposal of a negative weight. Further, this adjustment had the
explanatory advantage of correlation with several known phenomenon such as recent hot-air
balloon experiments. These could then be explained as due to phlogiston-rich air which
might be expected to exhibit a net upward force to lift the balloon. In addition the idea
of negative weight was consistent with the popular philosophical view that nature had
certain symmetries, for which the property known as "heaviness" may have a
counterpart known as "levity." Finally the concept of buoyancy may have seemed
to be in accord with that of negative weight.
Again Gale argues that Lavoisier was well prepared to "see" the mysterious gas
necessary in combustion was oxygen because of several factors. Among the reasons given was
his early educational emphasis on physics and therefore weights and balances which was
foreign to the qualitative approach of mainstream chemists. Another was the amateur status
of his education in chemistry and therefore his lack of indoctrination. Also cited were
his legal and business education which emphasized a balance sheet, his education in
chemistry under the iconoclast Roulle, and finally his Cartesian philosophical grounding
which idealized science as a unity. With this background structure, and its quantitative
nature, Lavoisier was able to analyze the observed facts with tools, both cognitive and
material, that allowed him to "see" the fact of weight gain in combustion as a
process of combination rather than disassociation. The failure of Priestly to accept these
conclusions has generally been depicted as due to his indoctrination in phlogiston theory,
and therefore; he was unable to "see" what was outside his scientific world
view.
Evaluation
The appeal of this view of science and discovery is that many of the
textbook examples in the history of science may be revised to fit its structure. It also
appears to provide an explanation for our feelings about the difficulty of discovery and
acceptance of ideas, "Now I see ... the reason those people can't understand my view
of reality is that they believe the wrong paradigm!" The explanatory strength of this
view of scientific discovery is due to the fact that it originates in the social sciences
as Kuhn acknowledged was the source of his first insights (1, p. viii). The primary method
of development of this view was through psychological analysis of the symptoms of those
involved in scientific discovery.
While this method of historical analysis may provide useful insights after having defined
what is necessary for scientific inquiry the weakness of Kuhn's approach is due to the
vague definition of science provided. While it is not stated as part of his intent it
appears that this definition is so broadly generalized that it can be applied to any and
every method of inquiry. At the very least we can now say that there is hardly a field of
inquiry to which it has not been applied. In any case Kuhn is not really concerned with
defining science at all as he eventually reveals, "Can very much depend upon a definition
of 'science'? " (1, p. 160). In fact, only after the central thesis was developed
did he provide a list of "essential characteristics" of scientific communities.
Here, it is crucial to observe that by simply omitting the word "science" these
criteria become applicable to all methods of research (1, p. 168). And we simply can not
define science by saying it must be done by scientists.
Again, the paradigm view of science pictures the successful scientific community as a
consensus group possessing a paradigm with increasing professional acknowledgment and
function as the sole authority to confer scientific truth status on theories. But now a
new problem has appeared. We have elevated the scientist to the status of "revelator
of truth," where "truth" is defined in terms of the prevailing paradigm
belief and not objective facts. Further, the psychological analysis in the book did not
adequately recognize the very real problem of willful "belief" or
"disbelief" within communities of people. Since objective facts do not determine
what is truth, when there is some compelling reason to believe something that is in
contradiction with the facts, the support of the paradigm community gives justification to
that choice. Taking this view to its logical end this "truth by vote" approach
would support any view that the reigning paradigm community decided was in their best
interests. To deny this potential is to deny the record of history where we see scientists
who, like all other people, have biases, selfish goals, and at times are deliberately
ignorant.
According to the "nearly perfect analogy" of evolution used by Kuhn the apparent
progress of science is only a matter of appearance because of an increase in complexity or
detail not a progression to toward some greater truth. Kuhn asks the question, "Does
it really help to imagine that there is some one full, objective, true account of nature
and that the proper measure of scientific achievement is the extent to which it brings us
closer to that ultimate goal" (1, p.171). If we take evolution as the proper
description of scientific inquiry, then we must conclude that, "nothing has been or
will be said [that] makes it a process of evolution toward anything" (1, pp.
170). If this is really the correct way to describe the process of scientific inquiry,
then Kuhn has shown that there is no real progress in science, but only changes in
paradigms.
Finally, some may object that this view was not really intended to describe how science should
be done but rather how it actually is done. But this does not ring true since
the original claim for this view was that it would define the very structure of the
phases of science. Ultimately, with this view of science none of the results of science
may be used to measure another paradigm since by giving up the concept of objective truth
the result is that the paradigm community or leader now reigns as "exclusive
arbiter" of what will be deemed worthy of scientific truth status (1, p. 168). In my
view the "science as consensus view" is so far from assuring the checks and
balances of individual scientific autonomy that it actually invites institutional tyranny.
