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Science
as Consensus
One of the most
important proponents of the "science as consensus" view of knowledge
has been Thomas Kuhn. He set forth his concept of the scientific
paradigm when he published, "The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions"(1). For Kuhn, scientific paradigms include, "law, theory,
application, and instrumentation together -- [and] provide models from
which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research" (1,
p. 10). The paradigm view of science pictures the successful scientific
community as a consensus group possessing a paradigm with increasing
professional acknowledgment. The concluding analogy used to illustrate
the process of choice between conflicting views of nature (or
paradigms) is evolutionary natural selection. Science is advanced
through, "conflict within the scientific community of the fittest way
to practice science" (1, p. 172). This view of scientific discovery has
three phases to its structure.
First is the pre-paradigm phase which is characterized by various
schools of thought vying for position but without sufficient
explanatory successes to their credit to gain preeminence. In this
phase the various paradigms are relatively vague and therefore new
observations can be accommodated because the paradigm's indefinite form
does not clearly demarcate what are acceptable or unacceptable results.
Discovery occurs as a result of the more or less random observations
made and utilized to formulate a more structured paradigm view.
Second is the "normal-science" phase where a clearly demarcated
paradigm view has been established as most successful in the eyes of
the majority of scientists in that field. In this case research is
conducted for, "determination of significant facts, matching of facts
with theory, and articulation of theory" (1, p. 34). Discovery of facts
that do not fit into the paradigm view are not expected and when
"successful" none are found.
Third is the "revolutionary science" phase where the emergence of
anomalies begin to challenge the reigning paradigm view. In this case
researchers uncover certain facts that can not be fitted within the
more precise paradigm in a straight forward manner. Those anomalies
which stubbornly remain irreconcilable have the potential to become
what are called "revolutionary anomalies." A key to the next step is
described by Kuhn as a "period of pronounced professional insecurity"
due to the anomalies' stubborn refusal to be assimilated into the
existing paradigm (1, p. 83). This is only resolved when a choice is
made between the old and new paradigm. When this process of
"conversion" occurs it is then possible to recognize not only that some
fact has been discovered but also what the discovery of that fact means
in the context of the new paradigm world view. According to Kuhn a
decision like this is not ultimately made based on some objective
facts, but rather, "a decision of that kind can only be made on faith"
(1, p. 158).
Discovery and
Acceptance
Kuhn's view of the
relationship between discovery and acceptance is in sharp contrast with
the ideas of logical inclusiveness. That interpretation of the nature
and function of scientific theory was closely associated with logical
positivism which would restrict the range and meaning of an accepted
theory so that it could not possibly conflict with any later theory
that made predictions about the same natural phenomena. Kuhn's concept
of the relationship between discovery and acceptance was illustrated in
one case by the transition from classical to relativistic dynamics in
physics. Here he asserts that Einstein's theory can be only be accepted
with the recognition that Newton's theory was wrong. On this view the
progress of science is not visualized as an increasingly inclusive
field of knowledge, but rather as a series of new and exclusive fields
of knowledge.
At several points Kuhn makes the case that interpretation of factual
data alone is not sufficient impetus for a scientific discovery. The
prime case study offered was the discovery of oxygen by Lavoisier. In
his time the phlogiston theory, which explained a quality understood as
"flammability", was a well established and attested scientific view of
nature. Then came Lavoisier's observation of weight gain after
combustion of certain materials such as sulfur and phosphorus. With the
unique training and background that prepared him he was allowed to
interpret the weight gain as a revolutionary anomaly.
George Gale has argued that this anomaly could easily have been
accounted for in the theory by an ad hoc adjustment in the
properties of phlogiston (1). All that was required was the proposal of
a negative weight. Further, this adjustment had the explanatory
advantage of correlation with several known phenomenon such as recent
hot-air balloon experiments. These could then be explained as due to
phlogiston-rich air which might be expected to exhibit a net upward
force to lift the balloon. In addition the idea of negative weight was
consistent with the popular philosophical view that nature had certain
symmetries, for which the property known as "heaviness" may have a
counterpart known as "levity." Finally the concept of buoyancy may have
seemed to be in accord with that of negative weight.
Again Gale argues that Lavoisier was well prepared to "see" the
mysterious gas necessary in combustion was oxygen because of several
factors. Among the reasons given was his early educational emphasis on
physics and therefore weights and balances which was foreign to the
qualitative approach of mainstream chemists. Another was the amateur
status of his education in chemistry and therefore his lack of
indoctrination. Also cited were his legal and business education which
emphasized a balance sheet, his education in chemistry under the
iconoclast Roulle, and finally his Cartesian philosophical grounding
which idealized science as a unity. With this background structure, and
its quantitative nature, Lavoisier was able to analyze the observed
facts with tools, both cognitive and material, that allowed him to
"see" the fact of weight gain in combustion as a process of combination
rather than disassociation. The failure of Priestly to accept these
conclusions has generally been depicted as due to his indoctrination in
phlogiston theory, and therefore; he was unable to "see" what was
outside his scientific world view.
Evaluation
The appeal of this
view of science and discovery is that many of the textbook examples in
the history of science may be revised to fit its structure. It also
appears to provide an explanation for our feelings about the difficulty
of discovery and acceptance of ideas, "Now I see ... the reason those
people can't understand my view of reality is that they believe the
wrong paradigm!" The explanatory strength of this view of scientific
discovery is due to the fact that it originates in the social sciences
as Kuhn acknowledged was the source of his first insights (1, p. viii).
The primary method of development of this view was through
psychological analysis of the symptoms of those involved in scientific
discovery.
While this method of historical analysis may provide useful insights
after having defined what is necessary for scientific inquiry the
weakness of Kuhn's approach is due to the vague definition of science
provided. While it is not stated as part of his intent it appears that
this definition is so broadly generalized that it can be applied to any
and every method of inquiry. At the very least we can now say that
there is hardly a field of inquiry to which it has not been applied. In
any case Kuhn is not really concerned with defining science at all as
he eventually reveals, "Can very much depend upon a definition of
'science'? " (1, p. 160). In fact, only after the central thesis was
developed did he provide a list of "essential characteristics" of
scientific communities. Here, it is crucial to observe that by simply
omitting the word "science" these criteria become applicable to all
methods of research (1, p. 168). And we simply can not define science
by saying it must be done by scientists.
Again, the paradigm view of science pictures the successful scientific
community as a consensus group possessing a paradigm with increasing
professional acknowledgment and function as the sole authority to
confer scientific truth status on theories. But now a new problem has
appeared. We have elevated the scientist to the status of "revelator of
truth," where "truth" is defined in terms of the prevailing paradigm
belief and not objective facts. Further, the psychological analysis in
the book did not adequately recognize the very real problem of willful
"belief" or "disbelief" within communities of people. Since objective
facts do not determine what is truth, when there is some compelling
reason to believe something that is in contradiction with the facts,
the support of the paradigm community gives justification to that
choice. Taking this view to its logical end this "truth by vote"
approach would support any view that the reigning paradigm community
decided was in their best interests. To deny this potential is to deny
the record of history where we see scientists who, like all other
people, have biases, selfish goals, and at times are deliberately
ignorant.
According to the "nearly perfect analogy" of evolution used by Kuhn the
apparent progress of science is only a matter of appearance because of
an increase in complexity or detail not a progression to toward some
greater truth. Kuhn asks the question, "Does it really help to imagine
that there is some one full, objective, true account of nature and that
the proper measure of scientific achievement is the extent to which it
brings us closer to that ultimate goal" (1, p.171). If we take
evolution as the proper description of scientific inquiry, then we must
conclude that, "nothing has been or will be said [that] makes it a
process of evolution toward anything" (1, pp. 170). If this is
really the correct way to describe the process of scientific inquiry,
then Kuhn has shown that there is no real progress in science, but only
changes in paradigms.
Finally, some may object that this view was not really intended to
describe how science should be done but rather how it actually is
done. But this does not ring true since the original claim for this
view was that it would define the very structure of the phases
of science. Ultimately, with this view of science none of the results
of science may be used to measure another paradigm since by giving up
the concept of objective truth the result is that the paradigm
community or leader now reigns as "exclusive arbiter" of what will be
deemed worthy of scientific truth status (1, p. 168). In my view the
"science as consensus view" is so far from assuring the checks and
balances of individual scientific autonomy that it actually invites
institutional tyranny.
Footnotes:
1.
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd
ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
2. George Gale, Theory of Science, (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1979), pp. 112-137.
Tim
Nordgren, 6-23-96
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